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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to determine the relationship between mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) and the post-acquisition performance of US utility firms to make 
a reasonable conclusion as to whether the market reaction to M&A’ s is good or bad. 
21 acquiring firms on the New York Stock Exchange in 2010 and 25 acquiring firms 
in 2011 are randomly chosen for this study. 
 
The Market model and Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) will be used in this 
paper. This study is trying to answer the question: can M&A create or destroy value 
for US utility firms? 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Merger and Acquisition (M&A) 
A merger is referred to as one company acquiring another company, meanwhile, the 
acquiring company buys both assets and liabilities of the target company. Although 
two companies combine together, the acquirer still retains its identity. Acquisition is 
similar to a merger, which indicates one company purchases another company, but a 
new company will probably be established.  
 
There are three forms of payment associated with M&A’s, including cash, securities 
and tangible assets of the target firms. In a stock transaction, stock shares increase 
only in the new firm. Because of different motives, acquiring companies choose 
different kinds of transactions. For example, the acquiring firm expects that the asset 
in the target firms will increase in value in the future, which results in the asset 
transaction is chosen. 
   
Mergers and acquisitions have several phases, but from previous studies, we find 
many arguments in this area. Boland (1970) classified the M&A phases into two 
steps, including pre-merger and post-merger. Schweiger and Weber (1989) argued 
that the M&A phases cover premerger and implementation. Salus (1989) argued that 
the M&A phases include pre-merger, merger and post-merger. Farley and Schwallie 
(1982) suggested the M&A phases should associate with integration of the strategic 
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plan, intelligent screening, evaluation of targets through creativity and analysis, 
understanding value and price, anticipating the post-acquisition phase, and efficient 
implementation. Kazemek and Grauman (1989) mentioned the following steps, 
involving assessment, joint planning, issue analysis, structure selection, securing 
approvals, final planning, and implementation. Parenteau and Weston (2003) claimed 
strategic planning, candidate screening, due diligence and deal execution, and the 
ultimate integration phase related to M&A. 
 
Mergers and acquisitions are often linked to a business or competitive strategy, for 
example, entering a new product/market segment or changing the basis of 
competition. So these M&A motives include:  
(i) to develop or enlarge the product line, or complement the products or service of 
the acquiring company, which leads to investment in product differentiation.  
(ii) to increase market power. The acquiring firms have more power to decide the 
price of products. Also, it can increase barriers of entry the industry. 
(iii) to increase market share. In this way, the acquiring firms become more 
competitive. 
 
M&A’s belong to corporate strategic terms. Parts of an intentional action pattern of 
relationships between business units within a big family of businesses. The strategy 
could be a relative one of remaining within the same or related industries or 
branching into other industries. Three strategies can describe these as follows: 
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The first is a vertical merger. Vertical mergers mean that it happens between two 
companies in different industries, producing different products or services. For 
example, a firm grows vertically in the value chain from extracting raw materials to 
manufacturing to retailing. Most often the logic behind is to improve the merger 
coordination effect through the integration of enterprises.  
 
Second is a horizontal merger, which happens between two companies in the same 
industry. A horizontal merger is a business integration and it is usually a rival 
offering the same goods or services. The horizontal merger helps acquiring firms to 
obtain a synergy effect, which is the effect of its co-operation between organizations 
(1+1>2) results when the performance of a combined unit is greater than what it 
would have been without any type of collaboration. 
 
The third is a conglomerate merger. This is a merger between enterprises which are 
involved in different business activities that are completely unrelated. There are two 
examples of enterprise group merger: pure and mix. Pure enterprise group mergers 
involve companies that have much in common, and mixed enterprise group mergers 
involve the companies that are looking for product extension or market expansion. 
 
1.2 New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
The New York Stock Exchange is located in New York city. Based on total market 
value of listed securities, it is considered as the biggest stock exchange in the global 
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market. The stock exchange has been run as a private organization, but it became a 
public entity in 2005 after the acquisition of the electronic trading exchange 
archipelago. The company's parent company is now known as the New York Stock 
Exchange in New York after the merger of the Euronext and European exchange in 
2007. 
 
Also known as the "big board", the NYSE previously relied on exchange-trading 
using only the public bidding mode. However, today more than half of the NYSE 
trading is conducted electronically.  
 
1.3 US utility industry  
1.3.1 Overview 
The electric utility industry is huge in size in the U.S. The electric power industry’s 
value chain includes four elements. The first is fuel source (for example, coal, 
nuclear energy, natural gas, and wind power), which can be converted into electrical 
energy. The second step is to generate power to meet household individual 
requirements. There must be a huge network of lines and power substation after the 
transmission and distribution in the power. Finally, the transmission power is 
delivered directly to ultimate users. 
 
American household consumption has accounted for 21% of the electric power now 
more than in 1978, the Edison Electric Institute estimated that the electrical energy 
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used by American family will go up by 11% by 2030. At the same time, the supply 
of resources is only expected to rise by 8.5%. Despite the long-term trend of growing 
energy use, the United States needs more energy saving as time goes on.  
 
1.3.2 M&A’s in the Utility Industry 
In the last two decades, utility companies attempted to increase the wealth of 
shareholders by using mergers and acquisitions (M&A).  
 
M&A’s can reduce cost in the current market of financial, regulatory and market 
pressures for utilities. Framing synergistic goals around financial scale remains the 
key driver of achieving increasing in value and good performance. Given the current 
marketplace, integrating operational synergies in a coherent manner is emerging as a 
strategic part of capturing and sustaining value – whether financial or operational – 
as well as addressing current market issues. 
 
1.4 Organization of the study 
In Chapter 2, we will study the concept of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). In 
addition, some previous research on mergers and acquisitions will be included. In 
Chapter 3, the methodology used in the study---- Market Model and Average 
Abnormal Returns (AAR), will be introduced in detail. We test and analyze results in 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 will be the conclusion, limitations and recommendations. 
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Chapter 2  
Literature Review 
2.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
According to Fama (1976), information is efficient in the market, in other words, 
information is widely, readily, easily and available to everyone. What’s more, the 
stock price is fairly priced because it already reflects the available information. 
 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) asserts that financial markets are efficient. 
On the one hand, the definitional ‘fully’ is a strict requirement, as a result, no real 
market could ever be efficient, implying that the EMH is almost certainly false. On 
the other hand, economics is a social science, and a hypothesis that is asymptotically 
true puts the EMH in contention for one of the strongest hypotheses in the whole of 
the social sciences.  
 
Under EMH, no one can make abnormal returns. If it is not true, we are against the 
efficient market hypothesis. There is a lot of academic literature on the market 
efficiency theory. Jensen (1978) argued that if the market is efficient, it is impossible 
to earn any risk adjusted net profits by trading on the basis of an information set. 
Reilly and Brown (1997) referred to in an efficient capital market, where security 
prices adjust rapidly to the arrival of new information and, that is, the current prices 
of securities have already fully reflected all available information. There are three 
forms related to EMH. They are weak, semi-strong and strong forms. 
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The weak form claims that all past information is fully reflected in today's stock 
price. Therefore, technical analysis cannot be used to predict future stock prices. If 
the price changes are random, the historical pricing data does not have value when 
participants forecast future prices. Fama and Blume(1966) used 30 individual stocks 
of the NJIA. They found after transaction costs, only 4 of 30 securities had positive 
average returns per filter. Even before transaction costs, filter rules were inferior to 
the Buy and Hold (B&H) strategy for all but two securities. Although small filter 
rules(0.5,1.0, and 1.5%) earned higher gross average returns(11.4%-20.9% per year) 
per security, when considering only long positions, net returns after transaction costs 
were not much different from B&H returns. Gray and Nielsen(1963) used wheat 
futures. They found that when applying stop-loss order rules to dominant contracts, 
there was little evidence of non-randomness in wheat futures price.  
 
Semi-strong form means that all public information is in the calculation for the stock 
current price. It means that there is no fundamental or technical analysis can be used 
to achieve higher returns. All investors will be unable to earn abnormal return from 
using the publicly available information. According to Fama(1970), the evidence 
shows that the dividends and earning announcement of common stock are associated 
with the efficient market model. Tests of semi-strong efficiency in securities markets 
have focused on events, including particular news items such as announcements of 
mergers and acquisitions. 
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Ball and Brown (1968) found that there is not a significant effect on the security 
prices after a firm’s earnings announcement. Most of the annual earnings’ 
information was taken account of by the market and had been combined into security 
price movement. Therefore, it provides empirical evidence of semi-strong form 
efficiency. 
 
In 1972, Scholes tested the impact of secondary offerings on the stock price. The 
stock prices decreased resulting from some non-public information which was just 
known by a few sellers. Beaver (1968) examined a sample of 143 firms from the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), including Trading Volume Activity (TVA) and 
Security Returns Variability (SRV), to test market reaction to annual earnings 
announcements. The results showed 33 percentage increases in TVA and a 61 
percent increase in SRV after the earnings announcement. 
 
Strong form efficiency means all the information in the market, whether public or 
private, are reflected on stock prices. No investors obtain an advantage even the 
inside information is given, so earning excess returns is not possible. Tests of the 
strong form EMH are focused on professional securities analysts, corporate insiders 
and portfolio managers. Many research’s have tested the strong-form efficient market 
hypothesis, such as Kyle (1985) who provides the first analysis of strategic informed 
trading. He considers a monopolistic insider who can trade with competitive market 
makers in the presence of noise traders. Information is fully reflected in prices only 
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at the end of the trading session, just before the time when it is to be announced 
publicly. Back and Pedersen (1998) introduce a continuous-time, finite-horizon 
model in which a monopolistic insider receives a flow of private information during 
the trading session. They found that the insider reveals the information slowly. 
Therefore, the market is not strong-form efficient.  
 
2.2 Event studies on M&A 
Mergers, acquisitions, stock splits, dividend announcements and deaths of key 
executives and so on are firm specific events which are internal events to the firm. 
Calvet and Lefoll (1985) performed an event study for 119 Canadian mergers and 
acquisitions and in similar way they found that the market was efficient in 
semi-strong form. 
 
Ravenscraft et al (1989) analyzed ex ante and ex post acquisitions using the 
manufacturing sector in the U.S. from the period 1957 to 1977. And the results 
showed the targeted corporations were very profitable but ex ante and ex post 
profitability of the targeted corporations decreased sharply. 
 
Caves (1989) studied ex ante case studies and ex post evaluation for merger and 
acquisitions in the U.S. The results showed very slight increases in the value of both 
the stock of the targeted corporations and the purchasers  
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Lichtenberg (1992) studied the relationship between changes in the control of 
companies, productivity and investment in research and development in the U.S from 
1972 to 1981. The results showed a large increase in total productivity of the factors 
of production after takeovers. 
 
Brown and Medoff (1988) analyzed the effect of acquisitions on corporate 
wages and employment in the U.S. The results showed mergers were associated with 
approximately a four percent decrease in wages and a two percent increase in total 
employment. 
 
Hall (1988) studied the effects of acquisitions on investment in research and 
development using the manufacturing sector in the U.S. from the period 1976 to 
1985. The results showed no indication that acquisitions result in a reduction in 
research and development expenditures. He also found corporations that successfully 
innovate are the preferred targets of potential purchasers. 
 
Loderer and Martin (1992) investigated 304 mergers and 155 acquisitions from 
1965-1986. The results indicated a negative, but statistically insignificant abnormal 
return over the five subsequent years for mergers and a positive, but an insignificant 
abnormal return for acquisitions. 
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Asquith et al (1983) found a positive return of 0.20 percent for acquiring companies 
which did cash transaction and a negative return of -2.40 percent for those doing 
stock transactions. Likewise, Andrade et al (2001) concluded that for the acquiring 
companies that make use of 100 percent cash deals are associated with better returns 
than transactions with stock. 
 
Healy et al (1992) examined the post acquisition performance for the 50 largest U.S. 
mergers between 1979 and mid-1984 and note that merged firms showed significant 
improvements in asset productivity relative to the respective industry average, 
leading to higher operating cash flow return. 
 
Gallet (1996) studied the impact of mergers on the U.S. steel industry. The study 
employed a New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) approach which 
estimates the degree of market power from a system of demand and supply equations. 
The results of the study showed market power after M&A’s to some extent in certain 
periods. The study analyzed yearly observations over the period between 1950 and 
1988 and results have revealed that in the period of 1968 to 1971 merger’s did not 
have a significant effect on market power in the steel industry, whereas mergers in 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
The paper is going to explain and analyze the market reaction to merger and 
acquisitions in the US utility industry and to test the market efficiency based on the 
data from 2010 and 2011. The objective is to determine whether there exists 
abnormal returns before or after a M&A announcement date. According to Copeland 
and Weston (1988), there are three types of models to test event studies, including: 
the Market Model, the Average Abnormal Return Model and the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model.  
 
3.1 The models  
3.1.1 Market Model 
Semi-strong form EMH is tested, using the Market Model. Firstly, we have to 
calculate the return on the stocks. The formula (Equation 3.1) is as follows: 
Rt = Pt/(Pt-1)-1                                             (Equation 3.1) 
where: 
Rt= return on stock during period t 
Pt= stock price during period t 
Pt-1= stock price during period t-1 
Secondly, the following formula (Equation 3.2) represents the Market Model. 
titmiiti RR ,,, ˆˆ εβα ++=                                        (Equation 3.2) 
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where: 
Ri,t= return on security i during period t 
αi= intercept of the equation for security i 
βi= slope of the equation for security i 
Rm,t= return on the market during period t 
εi,t= error term 
The STATA program can be used to do the regression of Equation 3.2. I use the 
NYSE index as Rm,t. In addition, εi,t, the error term, stands for the risk for a specific 
firm. 
 
To do the simple linear regression, we have four assumptions as follows:  
The expected value of the random error e: E(e)=0 
The variance of the random error e: var(e)=σ2 
The covariance between any pair of random errors ei and ej: cov(ei, ej)=0 
The values of e are normally distributed about their mean: e～N(0, σ2) 
(See Hill et al 2011) 
 
3.1.2 Abnormal Returns (AR) and Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) and 
Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACAR) 
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Equation 3.3 represents the Abnormal Return (AR). 
)ˆˆ( ,,, tmiititi RRAR βα +−=                                     (Equation 3.3) 
where,  
ARi,t=the abnormal return on security i during period t.  
Ri,=return on security i during period t.  
Rm,t =NYSE index. 
 




∑ARit                                          (Equation 3.4) 
where, N stands for the number of securities. 
T-test can be used. Null hypothesis is stated: 
H0:AARt =0 (if it is true, market is efficient)  
Alternative hypothesis is stated:  
Ha:AARt≠0 (if it is true, market is not efficient) 
If we do not reject null hypothesis, we can conclude that market is efficient. If we 
fail to reject null hypothesis, market is not efficient.  
 
3.1.3 Capital Asset Pricing Model – CAPM 
CAPM is a model that describes the relationship between risk and expected return 
and that is used in the pricing of risky securities. 
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Rit=Rft+βi(Rmt-Rft)                                         (Equation 3.5) 
where: 
Rit: return on security i at time t, 
Rft:risk-free rate at time t, 
Rmt:return on the market portfolio at time t, 
βi: beta for security i(systematic risk) 
 
The rationale behind the CAPM is as follows. From the Equation 3.5, we can find 
there is a linear relationship between the return on a particular security and beta (βi). 
Beta (βi) stands for systematic risk, which is different from unsystematic risk. It 
cannot be diversified. Rmt-Rft measures the market premium. If actual return is above 
the CAPM line, it indicates the security is underpriced. It is a good opportunity for 
the investor to buy the stock. If actual return is below the CAPM line, the security is 
overpriced. Therefore, the investor should sell the stock.  
 
3.2 Research Procedure 
3.2.1 Trading Volume 
Event studies can be used to test market reaction to M&A’s. First, I select an event 
window of 10 days, which refers to 5 days before t=0 (M&A) and 5 days after that 
time. V0 stands for the return on the event window. Second, I identify 20 days ex 
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event window and 20 days post event window. V-1 and V+1 stand for return on ex 
event window and return on post event window respectively.  
 
I use STATA to test V0, V-1 and V+1. Firstly, I compare V0 and V-1 in order to find 
whether the M&A announcement has an impact on trading volume. If V0 is bigger 
than V-1 and it is positive and significant, we can conclude that the M&A 
announcement does influence changes in trading volume and vice versa. Secondly, I 
compare V-1 and V+1 to test whether post-M&A can create value for U.S utility firms. 
If V+1 is bigger than V-1 and it is significantly positive, we can conclude that the 
value of U.S utility firms is increased after a M&A transaction and vice versa. 
Figure 3.1 
 
    Ex event window        event window        post event window 
I---------------------------I----------------I----------------I----------------------------I 
t=-20  V -1          t=-5       t=0        t=+5    V +1         t=+20 
                              V0 
 
3.2.2 Stock price 
The methodology to test stock price is the same as trading volume. STATA is used to 
test R0, R-1 and R+1. Firstly, I compare R0 and R-1 in order to find whether a M&A 
announcement has an impact on stock price. If R0 is bigger than R-1 and it is positive 
and significant, we can conclude that stock prices are influenced by M&A 
announcements. If the result is the reverse, then M&A announcements cannot affect 
stock prices. In addition, I compare R-1 and R+1 to test whether post-M&A can create 
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value for U.S utility firms. If R+1 is bigger than R-1 and it is significantly positive, we 
can conclude that the value of U.S utility firms is increased after a M&A transaction 
and vice versa. 
Figure 3.2 
 
    Ex event window        event window        post event window 
I---------------------------I----------------I----------------I----------------------------I 
t=-20  R -1          t=-5       t=0        t=+5    R +1         t=+20 
                              R0 
 
3.3 Data Selection 
This study chose 46 Utility companies traded on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and merger and acquisitions that took place from January 2010 to December 
2011. The company list in the sample should meet the following criteria: 
1) It is a common stock and traded on the New York Stock Exchange. 
2) Data for these companies must have undertaken an IPO for at least one year 
before the merger and acquisition announcement and continue at least one year 
after the merger and acquisition. 
3) The companies should exclude overlapping cases in the whole event window. 
 
3.4 Data sources 
The data of merger and acquisition announcement and daily closing prices for 2010 
and 2011 for this study were collected from Bloomberg. 
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Chapter 4 
Analysis of Results 
4.1 Overview 
This section is going to analyze and explain the results of the models, which derive 
from Chapter 3. 21 M&A in 2010 and 25 M&A in 2011 (the list of firms is attached 
in Appendix A). I have collected these data and run them in STATA to get these 
results. 
 
4.2 Stock Price 
4.2.1 Regression Analysis 
Market Model (Equation 3.2) derives from a linear relationship between beta and 
expected return. In the sample, I choose NYSE index as the market return. 
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Table 4.1 represents the regression results of the Market Model. From the output, it 
indicates that α (cons), which is the intercept of market model, is -0.0002921 and β 
(idxreturn), which is the slope of market model, is 0.7330951. The value of β 
measures the sensitivity of the security to the market return. The larger the value of β, 
the more sensitive the security to the market return. The result shows change in these 
securities is sensitive to the market change. 
 
R-squared is a broad application in linear regression. It measures whether the original 
data points match the linear regression. In other words, an R-squared value is to 
measure how well the final line fits the original data points. The higher R-squared 
value indicates stocks match the market model better, which means that the securities 
track the performance of the market index. In this paper, it refers to the US utility 
stocks following the pattern of the NYSE index. However, the results show 
R-squared is 0.0791 and adjusted R-squared is 0.0777. The value is relatively low. 
The movement of stocks in the sample does not track the performance of the NYSE 
index. 
 
4.2.2 Average Abnormal Return (AAR) Results 
There are three purposes to test for average abnormal returns. One is to test whether 
the market is efficient. The second one is to test whether M&A’s can affect stock 
price. The last one is to test whether the value of US utility firms can be increased 
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after a M&A. The output of average abnormal return is shown in Table 4.2. I make 
use of the daily stock price list. The event window is 10 days, which is 5 days before 
M&A and 5 days after M&A. 
Table 4.2 
 
Here, the T-test is used. A null hypothesis is stated: H0:AARt =0 and the alternative 
hypothesis is stated: Ha:AARt≠0. If the P-value is more than 0.05 (P>0.05), we do 
not reject the null hypothesis. If the P-value is less than 0.05 (P<0.05), we reject the 
null hypothesis. In the output, ar stands for average abnormal return (AAR). P- value 
is 0.6648, which is more than 0.05. Hence, we can conclude that the semi-strong 
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Table 4.4 
 
The aar2_1 in both Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 stands for the difference between return 
(R0) in event window and return (R-1) in ex-event window. The P-value is 0.2369, 
which is bigger than 0.05. Therefore, we do not reject null hypothesis and make a 
conclusion that M&A do not have impact on stock prices.  
Table 4.5 
 
Table 4.5 describes the output of difference between the return in the post-event 
window (R+1) and return in the ex-event window (R-1). The aar3_1 represents the 
difference between R+1 and R-1. From the output, the result shows that the difference 
is 0.0003155. However, P-value is 0.1182. We cannot reject the null hypothesis, H0 : 
mean=0. The results indicate that M&A’s do not create value for US utility firms. 
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4.3 Volume 
The daily volume of M&A firms in US utility industry has been collected. The object 
of test is to find whether there is a change in volume before a M&A and after a M&A. 
The results are presented in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6  
 
The avg1 (V-1) and avg2 (V0) in the output represent the average volume in ex event 
window and average volume in event window. They are 3245529 and 4614869, 
respectively, and the difference between them is 1369341. It obviously shows that 
the average volume (V0) in the event window is much higher than the average 
volume (V-1) in ex event window. On the other hand, the T-value and P-value are 
20.0759 and 0.0000, respectively. We reject the null hypothesis, H0 : mean (diff)=0 
and the difference between V0 and V-1 is statistically significant as well.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
The objective of this paper was to try to answer two questions. First, do M&A’s have 
influence on stock prices and second, can a M&A create value for US utility firms? I 
made use of daily stock price and volume of US utility firms from period 2010 and 
2011 to conduct the empirical research. 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
I obtained the results from STATA. It provided me with five conclusions. First, I run 
STATA to do the regression of the Market Model. According to the output, the 
securities chosen in the sample do not track the performance of the NYSE index. 
Second, based on the results from the average accumulative return (AAR), we can 
conclude that the market is efficient because we do not reject the null hypothesis, 
H0:AARt =0. Third, there is no abnormal return during the 10 days event window. 
Hence, M&A’s do not affect stock prices. Fourth, no changes take place between the 
return in the ex-event window and return in the post-event window. Therefore, it is 
reasonable for us to conclude that M&A’s cannot create value for US utility firms. 
Finally, the trading volume is relatively higher during the event window than that in 
the ex-event window. 
 
	   25	  
5.2 Limitations and Recommendations 
The conclusions show that M&A’s do not have an impact on stock prices. M&A’s 
cannot create firm’s value, either. There are two reasons to explain this conclusion. 
First, a lot of factors can affect stock prices, not only the M&A. What’s more, 
M&A’s are not the most important factor to determine the stock prices. Hence, it is 
normal that there is no influence. Second, I chose US utility industry as the sample. 
The characteristics of this industry are its stability, and the volatility is relatively low. 
The results reflect this feature. 
 
As I just chose US utility stocks on the NYSE, the sample is relatively small, which 
is also a reason that there is no statistically significant results. The sample is merely 
enough to meet the requirement to do the test. Perhaps, if we were to enlarge the 










	   26	  
References 
 
Andrade, G., M. Mitchell and E. Stafford (2001), “New Evidence and Perspectives 
      on Mergers”, Journal of Economics Perspectives, Vol. 15, pp. 103-120. 
 
Andrew J. S. (2011), “Mergers & Acquisitions from A to Z.” 
 
Asquith, P., R. Bruner and D. Mullins (1983), “The Gains to Bidding Firms from 
      Merger”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 11, pp. 121-139. 
 
Back, K. and H. Pedersen (1998), “Long-lived Information and Intraday Patterns”,  
Journal of Financial Markets, Vol. 1, pp. 385-402. 
 
Ball, R. and P. Brown (1968), “An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income 
      Numbers”, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 62, pp. 159-178. 
 
Beaver, W. (1968), “The Information Content of Annual Earnings Announcements”, 
      Journal of Accounting Research Supplement, Vol. 6, pp. 67–92. 
 
Boland, R. J. (1970), “Merger Planning: How Much Weight Do Personnel Factors 
      Carry”, Personnel, Vol. 47, pp. 8-13. 
 
Brown, C. and J. L. Medoff (1988), “The Impact of Firm Acquisition on Labor”, 
       Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 2, pp. 9-25.   
 
Calvet, L. and J. Lefoll (1985), “Risk and Return on Canadian Markets: Seasonality 
and Size effect”, Finance, Vol. 10, pp. 21-39. 
 
 
Caves, R.E. (1989), “Mergers, Takeovers and Economic Efficiency”, International 
	   27	  
      Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 23-65. 
 
Copeland, T.E. and J.F. Weston (1988), “Corporate Finance”, Journal of Finance, 
     Vol. 26, pp. 38-60. 
 
Emanuel, G., W. Yaakov and B. Chris (2011), “Mergers, Acquisitions & Strategic 
      Alliances”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 6, pp. 35-55. 
 
Fama, E. F. (1970), “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical 
      Work”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 25, pp. 383-417. 
 
Fama, E. F. (1976), Foundations of Finance. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Fama, E. F. and M.E. Blume (1966), “Filter Rules and Stock Market Trading”, 
      Journal of Business, Vol. 39, pp. 226-241. 
 
Farley, J.B. and E.D. Schwallie (1982), “An Approach toward Successful 
       Acquisitions”, The Texas Business Executive, Vol. 7, pp. 32-40. 
 
Finkelstein, S. and C.L. Cary (2010), “Advances in mergers and acquisitions”, 
      Journal of Business, Vol. 9, pp. 26-41. 
 
Gallet, B. (1996), “Mergers and Market Power in the US Steel Industry”, Journal of 
       Finance, Vol. 2, pp.38-51. 
 
Gray, R.W. and S.T. Nielsen (1963), “Rediscovery of Some Fundamental Price 
      Behavior Characteristics”, Paper Presented at the Meeting of the 
      Econometric Society, Vol. 4, pp. 65-81. 
 
Hall, C.A. (1988), “The Distribution of Plants and Animals in Space and Time Based 
	   28	  
      on Energy Investments and Costs Applied to Environmental Gradients”, 
      Journal of Finance, Vol. 5, pp.38-57.  
 
Harvard Business Review on mergers and acquisitions, 2001. 
 
Healy, P.M, K.G. Palpu and R.S. Ruback (1992), “Does Corporate Performance 
Improve After Merger”, Journal of Economics, Vol. 33, pp.135-176.   
 
Hill, R.C., E. William and C. Guay (2011), “Principles of Econometrics, 4th edition”, 
page 47 
 
Jensen, M. C. (1978), “Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency”, 
       Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 6, pp. 95-101. 
 
Kazemek, E. A. and D.M. Grauman (1989), “Awareness of Phases Helps Achieve 
       Successful Merger”, Healthcare Financial Management, Vol. 43, pp. 
       82-101. 
 
Kyle, A. (1985), “Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading,” Econometrics, Vol. 53, 
pp. 1315–1335. 
 
Lichtenberg, F. (1992), “R&D Investment and International Productivity Difference” 
NBER Working Paper, Vol. 6, pp. 41-61. 
 
Loderer, C. and K. Martin (1992), “Post-acquisition Performance of Acquiring 
       Firms.” Financial Management, Vol. 21, pp. 69-79. 
 
Parenteau, S. R. and F.J. Weston (2003), “It’s Never Too Early to Think 
       Integration”, Mergers and Acquisition, Vol. 38, pp. 17-23. 
 
	   29	  
Ravenscraft, D., J. David and F.M. Scherer (1989), “The Profitability of Mergers.” 
       Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 7, pp. 101-16. 
 
Reilly, F.K. and K. Brown (1997), “Investment analysis and Portfolio Management”, 
The Dryden Press. Vol. 7, pp. 45-67.   
  
Salus, N.P. (1989), “Public Relations before and after the Merger”, Journal of 
       Finance, Vol. 6, pp. 47-49. 
 
Schweiger, D. M. and Y. Weber (1989), “Strategies for managing human resources 
during mergers and acquisitions: An empirical investigation”, Human 
Resource Planning, Vol. 12, pp. 69-87. 
 
Scholes, M.S. (1972), “The Market for Securities: Substitution versus Price Pressure 
and the Effects of Information on Share Prices”,  













































10-­‐11-­‐12	   City	  of	  Nashua	  NH	   Cash	   270436Z	  US	  
10-­‐7-­‐2	   Mitsui	  &	  Co	  Ltd	   Cash	   8031	  JP	  
10-­‐4-­‐16	   Qatari	  Diar	  Real	  Estate	  Investment	  Co	   Undisclosed	   911304Z	  QD	  
10-­‐3-­‐31	   Aegean	  Marine	  Petroleum	  Net.	  Inc	   Undisclosed	   ANW	  US	  
10-­‐8-­‐23	   Brookfield	  Infrastructure	  Partners	  LP	   Stock	   BIP	  US	  
10-­‐6-­‐2	   Cantel	  Medical	  Corp	   Cash	   CMN	  US	  
10-­‐1-­‐11	   Danaher	  Corp	   Undisclosed	   DHR	  US	  
10-­‐1-­‐13	   DTE	  Energy	  Co	   Undisclosed	   DTE	  US	  
10-­‐3-­‐12	   Emera	  Inc	   Cash	   EMA	  CN	  
10-­‐2-­‐11	   FirstEnergy	  Corp	   Stock	   FE	  US	  
10-­‐12-­‐7	   AGL	  Resources	  Inc	   Cash	  &	  Stock	   GAS	  US	  
10-­‐4-­‐11	   GenOn	  Energy	  Inc	   Stock	   GEN	  US	  
10-­‐11-­‐16	   MasTec	  Inc	   Cash	   MTZ	  US	  
10-­‐10-­‐18	   Northeast	  Utilities	   Stock	   NU	  US	  
10-­‐9-­‐22	   NorthWestern	  Corp	   Cash	   NWE	  US	  
10-­‐2-­‐9	   Ormat	  Technologies	  Inc	   Undisclosed	   ORA	  US	  
10-­‐12-­‐30	   PICO	  Holdings	  Inc	   Undisclosed	   PICO	  US	  
10-­‐12-­‐29	   PAA	  Natural	  Gas	  Storage	  LP	   Cash	   PNG	  US	  
10-­‐12-­‐17	   Pentair	  Inc	   Undisclosed	   PNR	  US	  
10-­‐8-­‐9	   Regency	  Energy	  Partners	  LP	   Cash	   RGP	  US	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Announce	  





11-­‐5-­‐3	   Applied	  Industrial	  Tech.	  Inc	   Undisclosed	   AIT	  US	  
11-­‐6-­‐20	   Atlantic	  Power	  Corp	   Cash	  &	  Stock	   ATP	  CN	  
11-­‐8-­‐1	   American	  Water	  Works	  Co	  Inc	   Cash	   AWK	  US	  
11-­‐12-­‐29	   Brookfield	  Asset	  Mgt.	  Inc	   Cash	  &	  Stock	   BAM/A	  CN	  
11-­‐11-­‐3	   CenterPoint	  Energy	  Inc	   Undisclosed	   CNP	  US	  
11-­‐12-­‐30	   CPFL	  Energia	  SA	   Cash	   CPFE3	  BZ	  
11-­‐11-­‐22	   Dominion	  Resources	  Inc/VA	   Cash	   D	  US	  
11-­‐3-­‐2	   DPL	  Inc	   Undisclosed	   DPL	  US	  
11-­‐1-­‐4	   DCP	  Midstream	  Partners	  LP	   Cash	   DPM	  US	  
11-­‐1-­‐10	   Duke	  Energy	  Corp	   Stock	   DUK	  US	  
11-­‐8-­‐16	   Enbridge	  Inc	   Cash	   ENB	  CN	  
11-­‐6-­‐16	   Energy	  Transfer	  Equity	  LP	   Cash	  &	  Stock	   ETE	  US	  
11-­‐4-­‐28	   Exelon	  Corp	   Stock	   EXC	  US	  
11-­‐10-­‐12	   General	  Electric	  Co	   Cash	   GE	  US	  
11-­‐6-­‐20	   Heckmann	  Corp	   Undisclosed	   HEK	  US	  
11-­‐1-­‐24	   World	  Fuel	  Services	  Corp	   Undisclosed	   INT	  US	  
11-­‐1-­‐4	   Mueller	  Water	  Products	  Inc	   Cash	   MWA	  US	  
11-­‐3-­‐8	   National	  Grid	  PLC	   Undisclosed	   NG/	  LN	  
11-­‐12-­‐12	   NGL	  Energy	  Partners	  LP	   Cash	   NGL	  US	  
11-­‐1-­‐31	   Pampa	  Energia	  SA	   Cash	   PAMP	  AR	  
11-­‐9-­‐22	   RPM	  International	  Inc	   Undisclosed	   RPM	  US	  
11-­‐12-­‐27	   SJW	  Corp	   Cash	   SJW	  US	  
11-­‐7-­‐1	   Tortoise	  Capital	  Resources	  Corp	   Cash	   TTO	  US	  
11-­‐3-­‐31	   Vectren	  Corp	   Undisclosed	   VVC	  US	  
11-­‐6-­‐10	   Zuari	  Industries	  Ltd	   Stock	   ZUAR	  IN	  
 
